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Systematic Interference and Social Segmentation of Scientific 
Legal Discourse: Some Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical 
Results in the Field of Continental Administrative Law
I.
The reality of science is, like every reality -  particularly every social re­
ality -  a construct. That is not the whole story; but it cannot be had as 
anything but a construct. Everything that can be known about reality is 
based on distinctions by the observer concerned; what it “really” or “in it­
self’ is transcends any degree of distinction and therefore necessarily re­
mains neither understood nor comprehensible. Reality objectifies itself to 
the extent that distinctions are given linguistic form. But these forms are 
socially determined. Accordingly, presuming attentiveness, anyone 
studying reality , has to do with his own and others’ constructive accom­
plishments.
If one seeks the standpoint of the external observer and asks for structures 
that go beyond the actors’ intentions of action (without necessarily having 
to forget these), then the reality of the science of administrative law can 
to a first approximation be described as a section of a cognitive and social 
network of communication in political and legal science. What is, accord­
ingly, being considered is the incomprehensibly vast scene of de facto 
formation of opinion, over which any purely normative, epistemologi­
cally oriented theory of argumentation -  whatever it may have 
undertaken in detail -  can obviously be only partly in charge. Alongside 
and within the objective reasons, there are aspects operating that are alien 
to scientific teleology and methodology, for instance, even career 
interests. How these relate to each other in the process of formation of 
opinion and what the repercussions are for the content of administrative 
legal science is hard to establish and not apparent a priori or in general.
To gain enlightenment here, legal theory and sociology of knowledge 
have to be brought in. Sociology of knowledge treats science not merely 
as a system of thought, an autonomous collocation of theoretical objecti- 
vations, but also and primarily as a system of action in a context of non- 
theoretical references that mostly remain latent. It does not amount solely 
to an organizational and professional sociology, of whatever form, but 
takes the task primarily of throwing light on the interplay of cognitive 
and social standards that apply in science, confusing and beyond the vision 
of those involved as it is; including the implicit distinction between cogni­
tive and social, a boundary which is by no means well defined. An inves­
tigation of communication in legal science from the sociology-of-knowl- 
edge viewpoint will therefore do well not to overlook legal theory -  the 




























































































structures of legal science. But it cannot follow it blindly, since legal the­
ory as such has a strongly normative interest intrinsic to it, indeed an in­
terest in progress, which tempts towards the view of previous develop­
ments in legal science as basically the history of errors, or at best of pi­
oneers. Pursuing a normative interest in an analysis in history of science 
may very well be justified, but must not lead to failure to see the factors 
empirically operating in the process of scientific communication, nor to 
distorting the paths of research.
Since, in the science of administrative law, administration, law and 
science -  that is, three relatively autonomous areas of modem Western 
societies -  come together, it seems appropriate to consult above all that 
part of sociologically illuminated legal theory that deals with how this 
functional differentiation is to be thought of systematically, what relative 
autonomy means more exactly, how it comes about and maintains itself 
and what it brings about.
II.
This range of problems has been approached recently particularly by 
Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner with a new and pointed approach: 
a theory of social autopoiesis in general and legal autopoiesis in 
particular.
While from the viewpoint of the underlying biological theorem the hu­
man being is the autopoietic, i. e. self-producing and reproducing basic 
unit of society, so that social systems appear as “systems of linked indi­
viduals” and therefore precisely not as autopoietic systems, Luhmann 
(1983, 1984, 1986, 1987) has decoupled social systems from the human 
being as biological system and as system of consciousness. Henceforth 
communications were declared to be the basic units of social systems, and 
human individuals to be their environment. Communication in this sense 
is a systems operation. Since there are no systems operations outside the 
various system boundaries, social systems thus become conceived of as 
“operationally closed” or as it is also termed “communicatively closed”, 
which does not rule out their “informational openness”: while social sys­
tems reproduce themselves, they do so in response to their environment.
The interest that this approach may lay claim to for work in the sociology 
of knowledge lies in the fact that autopoiesis is regarded as possible for 
social sub-systems too, and specifically for them. This is admittedly a sur­
prising hypothesis from the terminological starting point. For how are the 
autopoiesis of the whole of society and of sub-systems to be reconciled 
with each other? For sub-systems are conceptually nothing but parts of a 




























































































closed vis-à-vis the overall system, and is communicatively linked with 
other sub-systems, at least via the overall system. Accordingly, one might 
think, sub-systems cannot have any autopoiesis vis-à-vis the overall system 
that would endanger, still less disrupt, the overall system; in other words, 
second-order autopoiesis would be under a general reservation of 
successful first-order autopoiesis. There would then manifestly be two 
types of autopoiesis, which Luhmann’s emphatically inflexible conceptual­
ization does not seem to permit. The terminological doubts arising from 
this can be left aside for the moment. However, they point to the fact that 
the key problem of an autopoietic theory of social systems -  from an em­
pirical viewpoint too -  lies in understanding the interference of social 
sub-systems, i. e. intersystem communication.
Teubner (1987b) has sought to cope better conceptually with the various 
degrees of autonomization of sub-systems, proposing a gradation of self­
reference, autonomy and autopoiesis, defining the latter through three 
self-referential mechanisms: Self-reproduction of all system components, 
self-maintenance of a system and self-observation as control of self-re­
production. As regards legal dogmatics, which functions as the self-ob­
serving agency for law, he says that it has a share in both the legal system 
and the system of knowledge and is subject to corresponding constraints 
of linkage, but over and above that is still “swallowed up” in the “specific 
communication circuits” of other social sub-systems in respect of which 
the law takes on control functions, so that it has to take their “intrinsic 
logic”, itself pursued in academic disciplines, into account (Teubner, 
1987b: 436-438). Autonomy of law is said to mean not total independence 
from external causal influences, but their non-linear mode of operation 
on the basis of “modulated” transformation mechanisms within the sys­
tem; the “incorporation of social meanings” into law is therefore said to 
be possible without loss of autonomy insofar as the “interventions fall un­
der the reservation of legal type norming” (Teubner, 1987b: 440-441).
This may be a construction that is plain enough for legal dogmatic 
thought itself. And Teubner comes, after all, from legal dogmatics, 
where, as one can see from his most recent publications on company law, 
he very deliberately employs autopoietic legal theory in order to loosen 
up the sphere of what can be treated legally, expand the leeway for pos­
sibilities of dogmatic distinction and modify the plausibility of proposed 
solutions. It operates similarly in his positions in the de-regulation debate 
which have also met with legal policy interest, sparking off a broad dis­
cussion around the keyword “reflexive law” (for heavy criticism of this 
sort of transposition of concepts, see recently Druwe, 1988).
But with a sociological theory presuming to understand reality, it must be 
doubted whether it is appropriate to the phenomena to speak of autonomy 




























































































ferentiation already existing externally, that is, a sort of mimicry effect. 
It appears as a formalism of only extremely limited reality content to as­
sume dedifferentiation of the legal system only where the lawful/unlawful 
distinction is no longer used, and by contrast maintenance if not enhance­
ment of its autonomy wherever reference to the logic of a social sub-sys­
tem other than law (“other-reference”) is brought about by changing legal 
programme structures while simultaneously maintaining compatibility 
with the fundamental legal code, the dominant lawful/unlawful difference, 
and therefore still within “self-reference” (Teubner, 1987b: 442-443). 
Here questions should be asked about the actual extent of substantial pene­
tration or filtering effects between the legal system and its environment, 
and what is more, without evolutionist suppositions. Where Teubner 
(1988b: 231-234) speaks of a “turn toward autopoiesis” and takes the view 
that “evolutionary primacy passes over to internal structural determina­
tion” or that embedment in society-wide, specifically moral, religious or 
political, contexts is being “increasingly phased out in favour of internal 
references in the law”, then these statements, as historical and empirical 
assertions about development, are not proven if understood to that degree 
of generality, and not very plausible either.
As a sphere of manifest system interference -  which distinguishes it fun­
damentally from the type of knowledge of the modem natural sciences of 
the 19th and 20th centuries -  legal dogmatics, particularly in public and 
administrative law, has available a range of concepts that are able to gen­
erate links to other social sub-systems and in part even have the explicit 
purpose of imperceptibly bringing back the principal differentiation of 
the legal system, lawful/unlawful, into its environment; without decisions 
being henceforth purely political, still less against the law, the distinction 
of lawful/unlawful always continues to be maintained -  albeit with shifts 
in contents.
One example of this is the concept of human dignity in Art. 1 of the Bonn 
Basic Law and the notion of freedom and equality in Articles 2 and 3 in­
terpreted in its light, which constitutes the conceptual framework for all 
fundamental rights and cannot deny its manifold pre- and extra-legal ref­
erences. At this level, “operational closure” of the legal system can at best 
be suggested through a verification of belonging that remains at the se­
mantic surface. The fact that such a suggestion is at all successful is 
specifically due to the Federal Constitutional Court’s case law; its judg­
ments have had a sort of innovatory value, i. e. once they have been 
adopted they enable one to content themselves with them as a legal basis 
without enquiring any further.
Before the introduction of the Basic Law and of constitutional case law, 
this range of issues was transcended in the changing combinations of 




























































































ing combinations of genuinely normative, empirical and formal logical 
elements of the view of law. Arguments from pure theory of knowledge 
have proved of only limited application here. There are practically no 
limits to the revival of apparently long exhausted elements of theory as 
long as they can be used functionally in the legal system. For the legal 
system, the change of teleologies and methodologies in legal science ac­
cordingly acts like a sort of breathing: an opening and closing of the legal 
discourse set going and controlled by jurists, which guarantees the stabil­
ity without stagnation that is so important to them, and further ensures 
that the legal system plays a part in deciding as to its identity and its 
learning capacity.
Speaking of the legal system’s “communicative closure” would accord­
ingly be appropriate only in a sense that ultimately remains metaphorical: 
the law is fenced off from its environment, but fences can also act as 
sluices, i. e. places to pass through. Using another image, one could also 
speak of revolving doors, which are usually set up where there is a par­
ticularly clear distinction between inside and outside but rapid, smooth 
passage is nevertheless important. The case with the legal system is not 
one of closure in the sense of hermetic sealing, but closure following a 
process of opening. This sort of view admittedly softens the idea of strict 
autopoiesis and instead rehabilitates the old idea of the system open to the 
environment that it was believed had to be overcome.
Just as empirically unconvincing as the hypothesis of “communicative clo­
sure”, and therefore also of the unity of the legal system, is the assump­
tion of a unity of academic legal discourse as the legal system’s agency of 
self-observation. Such a unity is admittedly readily assumed by legal the­
ory as a matter of course, probably because their own manifest position 
seems to be rooted in it. But there is interpretation, utilization and also 
cognition of the law in extremely varied contexts, differently patterned 
institutionally and given a fluctuating stamp by the multiplicity of modes 
of cognition and conduct involved. Not a few misunderstandings in legal 
theoretical disputes derive from the fact that the hypostatized unity of the 
legal system, implicitly and without noticing, has differing types of legal 
discourse ascribed to it (here structuralist legal semiotics has brought new 
insights; cf. e. g. Goodrich, 1987, and recently vol. 8/1988 of the journal 
“Droit et Société”, which contains several articles on “discours 
juridique”).
For empirical historical research in administrative legal science this 
means that it cannot take over their academic postulate of unity, but must 
approach the access to the reality of administrative legal science in such a 
way that the interference of the legal system with other social sub-systems 
can be captured and also made visible in the reconstruction of segments of 




























































































specific legal discourses. Admittedly, this makes recourse to the level of 
action of scholars that underlies their communication -  published texts -  
unavoidable; a level that remains excluded from view in Luhmann and 
Teubner because the concept of subject and of action has no place in their 
theory of social system.
III.
The elimination of the concept of subject and of action from sociology is 
not, however, the general opinion. Instead, attempts are continuously be­
ing made -  particularly in connection with the historical dimension of so­
ciety — to get out of the contra-position of person and system, action and 
structure, micro and macro sociology etc., felt to be unfruitful. Recent 
analyses on the “rational choice” approach deriving from economics, for 
instance, endeavour, alongside and in aspects of structural history, to 
make the importance of intentions, acts of will, discursive elements and 
more or less rational individual criteria of decision (identity, consistence, 
optimization) visible and thereby portray individual rationality as the ba­
sis for collective action too, specifically action in a group small enough to 
be grasped (Taylor, 1987). Structure as simultaneously condition for and 
outcome of action is taken up with systematic claims by Anthony Gid- 
dens’s social theory (1984), combining sociological tradition and the most 
recent approaches in the historical and social sciences. In German sociol­
ogy too, not only do people in fact continue to think simultaneously in 
categories of structure and action, but they also endeavour conceptually to 
set up alternatives to Luhmann’s radicality: thus e. g. Renate Mayntz 
(1988) in setting up the perspective of the actor, as expressed for instance 
in the tradition of cultural sociology, alongside the system perspective to 
supplement it (cf. also Schimank, 1988).
But there are also representatives of an autopoietically informed theory of 
social systems that see the relationship between individual and system dif­
ferently from Luhmann, starting from the human individuals as autopoi- 
etic systems and building up social systems on them as the result of human 
interactions, and understanding society (itself no longer regarded as a 
system for lack of clearly defined boundaries) as a “network of social 
systems with the individuals as ‘nodes’”, with the network character 
coming about from the fact that “individuals simultaneously take part in 
constituting several social systems, thereby linking them up together” 
(Hejl, 1987: 129-130; Teubner seems, in his latest publication on the 
matter -  1988b: 25 - ,  to approach this view where he mentions as one 
possibility of systemic interference that “people act in various system 
contexts”; this formulation -  not developed further systematically -  is 
presumably no longer compatible with his initial thesis that people always 




























































































Specifically in the area of law and legal science this is an empirically 
more plausible view of things since it does not, simply from its theoretical 
approach, make more difficult the question of how far the relative auton­
omy of the legal system is handled individually by participants in legal 
communication and these actions display structural characteristics that are 
not to be sought in the legal system itself, but are conditioned by the in­
terference of social sub-systems other than the law. To maintain the ca­
pacity for linkage of social sub-systems among each other, comprehensive 
individual role aggregation plays an important part: someone participates 
as manager of a firm in the economic system, as honorary judge in the le­
gal system, as honorary professor of the legal faculty in the academic 
system and as party member in the political and administrative system. It 
is the individual human being who in belonging in role-governed fashion 
to the various sub-systems has to arrange the compatibility of information 
and communications to avoid schizophrenic identity and enrichingly bring 
these subjective arrangements of subrationalities into the processes of 
system communication in which he operates.
Also fruitful for empirical research, because of its combination of the 
system and action perspectives, is the cultural sociology of Pierre Bour- 
dieu, who has since explicitly extended it to the legal sphere. The central 
concept is that of the “champ”, which is supposed to serve to keep internal 
and external aspects of social sub-systems together. Within the “champ 
juridique” , legal rules and legal theories constitute a space of possibilities 
of development; the principle of actual developmental dynamics, how­
ever, lies outside this, namely in the sphere of the legal actors and legal 
institutions that are in competition with each other to determine the di­
rection legal development will take (Bourdieu, 1986:4). Bourdieu there­
fore pleads for an analysis of legal discourse distinguished according to 
legal professions and their specific complexes of interests.
There are still other noteworthy possibilities of grasping the functions of 
the work of legal scholars for the legal system theoretically and making it 
accessible to empirical research. In the English-speaking area, for in­
stance, one might refer to “critical legal studies”, which are also sensitive 
to legal history (Gordon, 1983/84; Hunt, 1986; cf. also the controversy: 
An Exchange on Critical Legal Studies between Robert W. Gordon and 
William Nelson, in: Law and History Review, 6/1988, 139-186). In this 
connection one might further mention the very intensively pursued study 
of the “legal professions” that has been the particular merit of the Ameri­
can Bar Foundation (cf. only Abel, 1985); admittedly this is -  because of 
the intellectual and institutional peculiarities of the common-law system -  
bound up with a remoteness from academe and from government on the 
basis of which a history of continental European administrative legal 
science could not be written (cf. the criticism, justified in that respect, by 




























































































now take a glance at the empirical situation the study of which has been 
called for in the above theoretical considerations.
IV.
Particularly suitable for empirically disclosing the system - interference 
aspects of academic legal thinking is the legal professional journal, since it 
is not only university professors that contribute to this forum for forma­
tion of scientific opinion, but also administration officials, judges, advo­
cates and other practitioners. For more detailed analysis, administrative 
legal professional journals from the years 1880 to 1914 have been se­
lected, when administrative legal science in both France and Germany was 
going through its “classical” period, which played an important role for 
the identity and therefore also the developmental potential of present ad­
ministrative legal science. This period serves as a reference point for its 
unity and autonomy and as a point of comparison by which its progress -  
or at any rate change -  can be made visible.
Articles on administrative law were studied from the following journals: 
“Archiv für Ôffentliches Recht”, “Annalen des Deutschen Reiches fiir 
Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Statistik” and “Verwaltungsarchiv” for the 
German Reich,“Revue générale d’administration” and “Revue du droit 
public et de la science politique en France et à l’étranger” for France (on 
partial aspects see Heyen, 1986, 1988, 1989a; comprehensively and in de­
tail Heyen, 1989b). Four time periods were evaluated: 1880-1884, 1890- 
1894, 1900-1904, 1910-1914. For the German Reich, there were 392 ar­
ticles from within the country totalling some 14,000 pages; of these 85 
were from universities (21%, and 25% of the pages), 63 from the courts 
(16% and 14% respectively) and 132 from the administration (33% and 
32% respectively). For France there were 352 articles from inside the 
country with around 10,000 pages; of these 75 were from professors 
(21%, with 28% of the pages), 52 from judges (14% twice) and 142 from 
officials (40% and 36% respectively). Below we shall deal with the insti­
tutional differentiation in the profile of methods and topics of these 
articles.
In relation to the fineness of differentiation of method, no excessive 
claims should be placed on a quantitative analysis. Any great administra­
tive jurist, if one looks more closely, has at bottom a method of research 
in administrative law peculiar to him alone. In the context of a biography, 
full justice can be done to this sort of individuality. But even in a compar­
ison between two such individualized methods, reductions have to be 
made deriving from the comparative perspective of the observer. In com­
prehensive descriptions in methodological history, these reductions are 




























































































schools, periods etc. Such average quantities are indispensable in a quanti­
tative analysis too. The extent of reduction depends ultimately on the ob­
ject of investigation.
Since in the years from 1880 to 1914, on the prevailing view, a 
“cleansing” of administrative legal thinking from legal policy and legal 
historical aspects is supposed to have come about, in die direction of legal 
positivism, this constitutes a useful starting point for drawing up a 
methodological profile. Three descriptors were set up: “dogmatic”, 
“historical”, “political”. A text is called dogmatic where it deals with ad­
ministrative law in force; historical where it deals with administrative law 
that was was once in force but is no longer; political where it concerns 
administrative law to apply in future, whether the law in force is to be 
changed or to be maintained. The basis for the allocation is the intention 
of the article’s author; accordingly, the question whether he might allege 
something to be law in force when it is not and this allegation derives 
from a more or less unconfessed legal policy intent is left out of consid­
eration. The three descriptors mentioned may occur separately or in 
combination. On their basis, a total of 7 classifications are conceivable.
In developing suitable descriptors for the thematic profile, the problem 
lies in the fact that they have to break down the great area of administra­
tive law adequately and at the same time in a way practical for quantita­
tive analysis. The descriptors used (a total of 20) are oriented partly to 
administrative tasks, partly to administrative organization and partly to 
sets of problems in administrative legal dogmatics. As many descriptors 
can be employed as justified by the content. Multiple allocations are there­
fore not only possible but the general rale.
The subsequent consideration of topic profile is confined to those de­
scriptions that most frequently occur and have thus proved to be the most 
important: “administrative organization” (general internal state adminis­
tration, including the organization of consulates, railways, posts, cham­
bers of professions and state supervision in general); “public service” 
(government officials, and also judges and honorary officers, and addi­
tionally questions of training); “finances” (state expenditure of every type, 
including service obligations except for military service, budget and ac­
counts, questions of currency, the national lottery and public savings 
banks); “police” (general public safety and order, including criminal po­
lice law, civil status and registration, including public honours and ques­
tions of freedom of movement and emigration); “trade” (craft, industry 
and mining, energy supplies, commerce and banks, insurance, liberal pro­
fessions); “social law” (the poor and health, orphan care, work safety and 
employee insurance, employment procurement); “local administration” 
(the whole law on the organization and action of municipalities and mu­




























































































administration and in the administrative courts, but without military or 
church courts); “general administrative law” (legal sources, basic concepts 
-  e. g. public law, statute, legal person, administrative act etc. -, legal 
institutions that extend over various areas, e. g. public ownership).
How system interference is reflected in administrative legal science is 
clear from figures 1-3 for the methodological profile, which will now be 
explained (calculated on the basis of the arithmetic mean of number of 
articles and number of pages, represented in percentages) and figure 4 for 
the thematic profile (calculated according to number of articles only). 
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1. Figure 1 shows for both France (F) and the German Reich (D) that the 
average methodological profile (tot) is significantly different if one con­
siders the institutional background of the articles’ authors, that is, their 
differing ties to sub-systems. A particularly striking methodological dis­
crepancy is that between articles by judges and high officials.
For the German Reich, it is to be stressed that among professors (uni), the 
dogmatic, historical and political sections are in a clear sequence. There is 
a strikingly strong position for “dogmatic + historical” (doghis). Judges 
(jur) give the dogmatic view, i. e. the law that happens to be in force, still 
more importance than the professors, particularly clearly in the strong 
emphasis on the “purely dogmatic” approach (purdog), while historical 
and political elements follow at equally large distance, with the political 
parts -  specifically in the combination “dogmatic + political” (poldog) -  
notably reaching a higher level than for professors. Administrative offi­
cials (adm) by contrast show a clearly different methodological profile. 
They have just as strong an orientation to the positive law as professors 
but they attribute twice as much weight to its political evaluation, as 
emerges from the highly developed use of the “purely political” approach 
(purpol). History seems to be rather in the background, although it is 
given more attention than by judges.
For France, it should be stressed that dogmatic method has the clear pref­
erence of the universities. In the administration by contrast historical 
aspects have an almost equal position alongside dogmatic ones, even if this 
largely takes place by separating them out in the form of “purely histori­
cal” articles (purhis). Still more striking is that the political assessment of 
the law in force is given twice as much weight as by the universities. Jus­
tice is clearly closer in its scholarly position to the university than to the 
administration. The distance from the administration becomes very clear 
in the rejection of the overall perspective preferred by the latter, 
“dogmatic + historical + political” (dohipo), and in the strong stress on a 
“purely dogmatic” (purdog) view, which scarcely lags behind the combi­
nation “dogmatic + historical” (doghis) in importance.
As regards the comparison between the two countries, it should be noted 
that in a total view of all articles dealt with (tot) the methodological 
structures are similar. The same is essentially true for production of uni­
versity articles, though with noteworthy departures. While the French 
professors are more strongly “purely dogmatic” (purdog) oriented than 
their German colleagues, the converse is the case for “purely historical” 
(purhis) and “dogmatic + historical” (doghis). Both justice and the admin­
istration by contrast differ considerably in methodological approach in 




























































































torical” (purhis), “purely political” (purpol) and “historical + political” 
(hispol) play practically no part for them, which cannot be said of the 
French judges. Among officials, finally, in France the weight attaching to 
“purely historical” (purhis) and “dogmatic + historical + political” 
(dohipo) is striking, and in German the weight of “purely dogmatic” 
(purdog) and “political + dogmatic” (poldog). The distinction between 
university and administration is also manifested, as far as the methodolog­
ical approach is concerned, in France in the dogmatic and in Germany in 
the historical aspects. Taken all that, the German administration seems 
less historically aware in academic terms but with rather more of a future 
orientation than the French one.
2. To improve the overview, it seems appropriate to combine the individ­
ual methodological classifications in accordance with the basic distinctions 
(figure 2). In the area “total dogmatic” (totdog), French university teach­
ers have a rather more positive-law view than German ones (an inheri­
tance from the École de l’Exégèse), while justice and administration in 
France have a remarkably less positive-law approach in France than in 
Germany. The positive-law approach is more or less equally developed by 
university teachers and administrative officials in Germany, while in 
France there is a marked difference here. In the “total historical” area 
(tothis), German professors are clearly more committed than the French 
(an inheritance from the Historical School). There is a still more marked 
imbalance, admittedly, in justice and above all in the administration, but 
this time in favour of the French side. The historical view of administra­
tive law is accordingly differently centred in the German Reich than in 
France. In the “total political” (totpol) area, finally, Germany and France 
are at more or less the same level in university and administration; in 
France the difference between the two institutions is rather greater.
3. A further form of combination of the data seems appropriate (figure 
3). Firstly, the “purely dogmatic” and “dogmatic + historical” methods 
can be combined as a special unit. This combination is characterized by 
the orientation to the law in force, and it is in order to understand it bet­
ter that historical considerations are brought in. Such an attitude to ad­
ministrative law can be termed “conservative-descriptive”. Secondly, 
“purely political”, “historical + political” and “political + dogmatic” can 
be combined in a unit. This combination is characterized essentially by the 
orientation to the legal policy aspect of the argument, and it is in this con­
nection that historical or dogmatic considerations are brought in. This 
sort of attitude to administrative law can be termed “progressive-evalua­
tive”, in the borderline case also including the desire for the legal policy 
status quo or even the restoration of a past state of law. One might fre­
quently also interpret the overall perspective “dogmatic + historical + 
political” in the sense. But here there is an ambiguity so that it seems 




























































































In the “progressive-evaluative” approach (progress) the proportion of 
professors in Germany and France is equally low. Among German 
administrative officials by contrast it is rather more strongly marked than 
among the French, so that the heavy difference between university and 
administration in Germany comes more strongly to the fore here too. At 
the same time, however, the “conservative-descriptive” approach 
(conserv) in the German administration plays a markedly greater part 
than for the French. This may at first sight seem a contradiction, but can 
be explained from the definition of the descriptors “conservative-descrip­
tive” and “progressive-evaluative”, which denote contrary but not con­
tradictory viewpoints, that is, do not cover the whole spectrum of possible 
descriptions. The German administration goes more strongly for this al­
ternative than does the French, for which the overall perspective 
“dogmatic + historical + political” (dohipo) is also of importance. It is 
striking that in both countries academe and justice are together clearly 
distinguished in respect to the “conservative-descriptive” approach from 
the administration, while for the “progressive-evaluative” approach jus­
tice is at a level of proportions between academe and administration.
VI.
The fact that institutional background marks not only the methodological 
profile but also the thematic profile is made clear by figure 4. The differ­
ing height of the “towers” is to be explained by the admissibility of mul­
tiple classifications. French articles on average have more descriptors 
than German ones, that is are more varied thematically and less 
specialized.
Accordingly, for the production of administrative-law articles by uni­
versities (uni), justice (jur) and administration (adm) there are thematic 
characteristics that embrace both countries too. For professors, general 
administrative law is characteristic, for judges administrative legal pro­
tection and for officials finance and social law, along with a markedly 
slight interest in general administrative law. As national peculiarities one 
might note the comparatively high importance of administrative legal 
protection for the French professors, of police and social law for German 
professors, of social law and local administration for French judges, of 
the public service, administrative organization and local administration 
for French officials and of finance for German officials.
As regards the thematic structure of general administrative law to which 
the decisive importance attaches in both France and Germany for building 
up an autonomous administrative legal science, a few important common 
factors can be established. Among these -  though this admittedly does not 




























































































à-vis administrative legal protection, on the other no less important impe­
tus towards taking a distance from finance, welfare and local administra­
tion, all of them areas in which in the 20th century non-legal administra­
tive science has taken shape (details in Heyen, 1989b: 142-145).
The topics can of course be brought into relationship not only with the 
institutional background of the article writers but also with the method­
ological perspectives used by them (statistical indications in Heyen, 1989b: 
138). The “conservative-descriptive” approach takes on its greatest 
importance in Germany in relation to the following areas (only those also 
considered in figure 4 are mentioned): general administrative law, 
administrative legal protection, police and public service. For the 
“progressive-evaluative” approach these are: social law, trade, finance and 
local administration. In France the corresponding legal areas for the 
“conservative-descriptive” approach are: general administrative law, ad­
ministrative legal protection, police and local administration; for the 
“progressive-evaluative” approach: public service, social law, finance and 
trade. By comparison with the German Reich it is striking that there is 
overwhelming structural concord except for local administration, which 
in centralist France constitutes a politically sensitive topic, and the public 
service, which around the turn of the century in Germany had long been 
statutorily regulated and had contributed not a little to the building up of 
German general administrative law, while in France it still constituted an 
object of legal policy disputes.
VII.
To sum up:
On the example of a quantitative analysis of administrative legal profes­
sional journals from France and Germany, the administrative legal sys­
tems of which have decisively influenced continental European develop­
ments in administrative law, it has been demonstrated above that the ad­
ministrative legal science of professors, judges and administrative offi­
cials is characterized by specific methodological and thematic profiles. 
These differ from each other to such an extent that it seems justified to 
speak of a social segmentation of academic legal discourse based on sys­
tem interference. The social sub-systems of law, politics/administration 
and science that come together in administrative legal science enter 
through the actors professionally operating in them into a scholarly dis­
course that externally seems to be unitary but internally remains appro­
priately structured in accordance with the institutional differences in the 
range of authors and addressees. At the same time it indicates negotiating 
positions and accordingly prepares for institutionally effective interac­




























































































ciary and and the administration take from this discourse essentially only 
what meets their own criteria of selection. Accordingly, if the possibilities 
of administrative legal thought declared to be scholarly and therefore de­
tached from immediate constraints of action develop in texts on a basi­
cally equal footing, nevertheless their chances of effect and influence de­
pend on the broader context, determined by multiple socially and politi­
cally institutionalized imbalances.
It is, accordingly, not possible to speak of administrative legal science as a 
self-observation agency of the legal system alone. It is in part always also 
a self-observation agency of other social sub-systems (particularly the 
political-administrative system) and can therefore be conceived of only as 
a precarious unity, exposed to the danger of fragmentation. It accordingly 
seems more appropriate from a historical and empirical viewpoint to 
continue seeing the law of modem Western societies as a system open to 
the environment and take the theory of legal autopoiesis as a challenge to 
take the mechanisms operating in the production and maintenance of law 
autonomy seriously and to study them with attention and precision.
Bibliography
Abel, Richard L. (1985), Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions: 
An Exploratory Essay, in: American Bar Foundation Research Journal, 
vol. 1, 1-79.
Astly, W. Graham (1985), Administrative Science as Socially Constructed 
Truth, in: 30 Administrative Science Quarterly 497-513
Bourdieu, Pierre (1986), La force du droit. Eléments pour une sociologie 
du champ juridique, in: 64 Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 3-19
Druwe, Ulrich (1988), “Selbstorganisation” in den Sozialwissenschaften. 
Wissenschaftstheoretische Anmerkungen zur Übertragung der naturwis- 
senschaftlichen Selbstorganisationsmodelle auf sozialwissenschaftliche 
Fragestellungen, in: 40 Kôlner Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie und Sozial- 
psychologie 762-775
Giddens, Anthony (1984), The Constitution of Society. Outline of the 
Theory of Structuration, Cambridge
Goodrich, Peter (1987), Legal discourse. Studies in linguistics, rhetoric 
and legal analysis, London





























































































Heijl, Peter M. (1987), Zum Begriff des Individuums. Bemerkungen zum 
ungeklarten Verhâltnis von Soziologie und Psychologie, in: G. Schiepek 
(ed.), Système erkennen Système, Miinchen/Weinheim, 115-154
Heyen, Erk Volkmar (1976a), Erfahrung und Begriindung in der Ver- 
waltungswissenschaft: Grundprobleme interdisziplinarer Verstandigung, 
in: 9 Die Verwaltung 433-451
-  (1976b), Philosophische Perspektiven zur Geschichtsschreibung der 
Rechtsdogmatik, in: 62 Archiv fiir Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 475-496
-  (1986), Herkunftsprofile des “Archivs fiir offentliches Recht” im 
kaiserlichen Deutschland, in: E. V. Heyen (ed.), Historische Soziologie 
der Rechtswissenschaft, Frankfurt a. M., 173-197
-  (1987), Selbstberatung der Verwaltung und Verwaltungswissenschaft, 
in: R. Koch (ed.), Verwaltungsforschung in Perspektive. Ein Colloquium 
zur Methode, zum Konzept und zum Transfer, Baden-Baden, 245-257
-  (1988), Science et action: sur la culture de l’esprit juridique dans 
l ’espace administratif, in: A.-J. Arnaud (ed.), La culture des revues 
juridiques françaises, Milano, 105-122
-  (1989a), Sur la segmentation du discours scientifique en droit 
administratif vers 1900. L ’approche méthodologique en France et en 
Allemagne, in: 1 Jahrbuch für europaische Verwaltungsgeschichte 
/Annuaire d’histoire administrative européenne/Annuario per la storia 
amministrativa europea/Yearbook of European Administrative History, 
207-220
-  (1989b), Profile der deutschen und franzôsischen Verwaltungsrecht- 
wissenschaft 1880-1914, Frankfurt a. M.
Hunt, Alan (1986), The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, in: 6 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 1-45
Luhmann, Niklas (1983), Die Einheit des Rechtssystems, in: 14 
Rechtstheorie 129-154
-  (1984), Soziale Système. GrundriB einer allgemeinen Theorie, 
Frankfurt a. M.




























































































-  (1987), Autopoiesis als soziologischer Begriff, in: H. Haferkamp/M. 
Schmid (ed.), Sinn, Kommunikation und soziale Differenzierung. 
Beitrage zu Luhmanns Théorie sozialer Système, Frankfurt a. M., 307- 
324
Mayntz, Renate (1988), Funktionelle Teilsysteme in der Theorie sozialer 
Differenzierung, in: R. Mayntz et al., Differenzierung und Verselb- 
standigung. Zur Entwicklung gesellschaftlicher Teilsysteme, Frankfurt a. 
M./New York, 11-44
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (1986), Comparing Legal Professions Cross- 
Nationally: From a Profession-centered to a State-centered Approach, in: 
American Bar Foundation Research Journal, voi. 3, 415-446
Schimank, Uwe (1988), Gesellschaftliche Teilsysteme als Akteurfiktionen, 
in: 40 Kôlner Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 619-639
Taylor, Michael (ed.) (1987), Rationality und Revolution, Cambridge
Teubner, Gunther (1987a), Hyperzyklus in Recht und Organisation. Zum 
Verhaltnis von Selbstbeobachtung, Selbstkonstitution und Autopoiese, in: 
H. Haferkamp/M. Schmid (ed.), Sinn, Kommunikation und soziale Dif­
ferenzierung. Beitrage zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Système, Frankfurt 
a. M„ 89-123.
-  (1987b), Episodenverkniipfung. Zur Steigerung von Selbstreferenz im 
Recht, in: D. Baecker et al. (ed.), Theorie als Passion. Niklas Luhmann 
zum 60. Geburtstag, Frankfurt a. M., 423-446
-  (1988a), Evolution of Autopoietic Law, in: G. Teubner (ed.), Auto- 
poietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society, Berlin/New York, 
217-241
-  (1988b), “And God laughed...”. Indeterminacy, self-reference and 
paradox in law (EUI Working Paper 88/342), Florence
Author’s address:




























































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge -  depending on the availability of
stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy
From Name . .
Address
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1990/91





































































































EUI Working Papers as from 1990
As from January 1990, the EUI Working Papers Series is divided into six 
sub-series, each series is numbered individually (i.e. EUI Working Paper 
HEC No. 90/1; ECO No. 90/1; LAW No. 90/1; SPS No. 90/1; EPU No. 




























































































Working Papers in Law
LAW No. 90/1
David NELKEN
The Truth about Law’s Truth
LAW No. 90/2
Antonio CASSESE/Andrew 
CLAPHAM/Joseph H.H. WEILER 
1992 -  What are our Rights? 
Agenda for a Human Rights 
Action Plan
LAW No. 90/3 
Sophie PAPAEFTHYMIOU 




Legislativer Trilog im Institutio- 
nellen Dreieck der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaft. Das Verfahren der 
Zusammenarbeit nach Artikel 
149 Absatz 2 EWGV.
LAW No. 90/5
Renaud DEHOUSSE 
Représentation territoriale et 
représentation institutionnelle: 
réflexions sur la réforme du Sénat 






F. H. M. POSSEN
Primus Inter Pares: The European
Court and National Courts.
The Follow-up by National Courts 
of Preliminary Rulings
ex Art. 177 of the Treaty of 
Rome: A Report on the Situation 
in the Netherlands
LAW No. 90/7 
Reiner GRUNDMANN 
Luhmann Conservative, Luhmann 
Progressive
LAW No. 90/8 
Bruno DE WITTE 
The Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes in the Context of 
Community Regional Policy
LAW No. 90/9 
Anne-Laurence FAROUX 
Le Ministère de la Culture en 
France: Création et organisation
LAW No. 91/10
Christian JOERGES (ed.)
European Product Safety, Internal 
Market Policy and the New Approach to 
Technical Harmonisation and Standards
Vol. 1
Christian JOERGES




European Product Safety, Internal 
Market Policy and the New Approach to 




Product Safety Legislation 






























































































European Product Safety, Internal 
Market Policy and the New Approach to 





Erk Volkmar HEYEN 
Systematic Interference and Social 
Segmentation of Scientific Legal 
Discourse: Some Theoretical 
Perspectives and Empirical 
Results in the Field of Continental
Product Safety Legislation in the Administrative Law 
Federal Republic o f Germany and 
in the United States
LAW No. 91/13
Christian JOERGES (ed.)
European Product Safety, Internal 
Market Policy and the New Approach to 
Technical Harmonisation and Standards 
Vol. 4
Josef FALKE/Christian JOERGES 
“Traditional” Harmonisation 
Policy, European Consumer Pro­




European Product Safety, Internal 
Market Policy and the New Approach to 








Markt ohne Staat? Die 
Wirtschaftsverfassung der Ge- 
meinschaft und die Renaissance 
der regulativen Politik
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
'
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
•&
im
 i
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
